Development of Ballistic Limit Equations for Dual-Wall Spacecraft Shielding: A Concise History and Suggestions for Future Development by Schonberg, William P.
Missouri University of Science and Technology 
Scholars' Mine 
Civil, Architectural and Environmental 
Engineering Faculty Research & Creative Works 
Civil, Architectural and Environmental 
Engineering 
01 Jan 2008 
Development of Ballistic Limit Equations for Dual-Wall Spacecraft 
Shielding: A Concise History and Suggestions for Future 
Development 
William P. Schonberg 
Missouri University of Science and Technology, wschon@mst.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/civarc_enveng_facwork 
 Part of the Civil Engineering Commons 
Recommended Citation 
W. P. Schonberg, "Development of Ballistic Limit Equations for Dual-Wall Spacecraft Shielding: A Concise 
History and Suggestions for Future Development," Proceedings of the AIAA/ASME/ASCE/AHS/ASC 
Structures, Structural Dynamics, and Materials Conference (2008, Schaumburg, IL), American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), Jan 2008. 
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2008-1966 
This Article - Conference proceedings is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars' Mine. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Civil, Architectural and Environmental Engineering Faculty Research & Creative Works by 
an authorized administrator of Scholars' Mine. This work is protected by U. S. Copyright Law. Unauthorized use 
including reproduction for redistribution requires the permission of the copyright holder. For more information, 
please contact scholarsmine@mst.edu. 
 




                                                          
The Development of Ballistic Limit Equations for Dual-Wall 
Spacecraft Shielding: A Concise History and Suggestions for 
Future Development 
William P. Schonberg1
Missouri University of Science and Technology, Rolla, Missouri 65409 
All earth-orbiting spacecraft are susceptible to impacts by orbital debris particles, which 
can occur at extremely high speeds and can damage flight- and mission-critical systems. The 
traditional damage mitigating shield design for this threat consists of a “bumper” that is 
placed at a relatively small distance away from the main “inner wall” of the spacecraft. The 
performance of a hypervelocity impact shield is typically characterized by its ballistic limit 
equation, which is typically drawn as a line of demarcation between regions of rear-wall 
perforation and no perforation; when graphically represented, it is often referred to as a 
ballistic limit curve. Once developed, these equations and curves can be used to optimize the 
design of spacecraft wall parameters so that the resulting shields can withstand a wide 
variety of high-speed impacts by orbital debris. This paper presents some comments and 
observations on the development of the three-part ballistic limit equation used by NASA to 
predict the response of dual-wall structural systems under hypervelocity projectile impact. 
The paper concludes with some insights into the limitations of the current version of 
BUMPER II, NASA’s risk analysis code, and with several suggestions regarding how 
BUMPER II could be improved and modified so that, for example, it could be used as an 
integral part of a probabilistic risk assessment exercise. 
I. Introduction 
All earth-orbiting spacecraft are susceptible to impacts by orbital debris particles, which can occur at extremely 
high speeds and can damage flight- and mission-critical systems. The traditional damage mitigating shield design of 
a “bumper” placed at a relatively small distance away from the main “inner wall” of a spacecraft has been studied 
extensively in the last four decades as a means of reducing the perforation threat of hypervelocity projectiles. The 
performance of a hypervelocity impact shield is characterized by its ballistic limit equation (BLE), which typically 
defines the threshold particle size that would cause perforation of the innermost wall of a multi-wall system. BLEs 
are typically drawn as lines of demarcation between regions of rear-wall perforation and no perforation in two-
dimensional spherical projectile diameter-impact velocity space; when graphically represented, they are often 
referred to as ballistic limit curves (BLCs). Figure 1 below shows generic dual-wall and single-wall BLCs, and 
highlights some of the important phenomenology that occurs in various impact velocity regimes1. 
NASA and ESA continue to develop BLCs for their structural configurations of interest. The majority of 
previous NASA and ESA efforts have been directed towards developing BLCs for dual-wall systems such as those 
that can be found on the International Space Station. Data obtained using spherical aluminum projectiles fired in 
light gas guns at impact velocities between 3 and 7 km/s is typically was fitted with scaled single-wall equations 
below 3 km/s, and with theoretical momentum/energy based penetration relationships above 7 km/s to obtain BLCs 
that cover the full range of impact velocity. 
 This paper presents some comments and observations on the development of the three-part BLE currently used 
by NASA to predict the response of dual-wall structural systems under hypervelocity projectile impact.  In 
particular, this paper traces the history of the development of this three-part equation, beginning in the 1960s and 
1970s when early work focused on obtaining so-called “sizing equations”, moving into the 1980s when work 
centered on developing a risk analysis tool for the Space Station Freedom project, and ending in the late 
1990s/early2000s as the three-part BLE was adapted to serve the needs of other projects and programs. The paper 
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concludes with some insights into the limitations of the current version of BUMPER II, NASA’s risk analysis code, 
and with several suggestions regarding how BUMPER II could be improved and modified so that, for example, it 
could be used as an integral part of a probabilistic risk assessment exercise. 
 

























II. Early Work 
 
Figure 1. Generic Single-wall and Double-Wall Ballistic Limit Curves0 
 
In the mid-1960s, Boeing and the General Motors Defense Research Laboratories both performed studies that 
led to two generic types of ballistic limit equations for a given multi-wall structural configuration as functions of 
impact velocity, projectile diameter, etc: (a) the number of sheets penetrated; and, (b) the total thickness required to 
stop rear or main wall penetration. The Type (b) equations usually had a hump around V=3 km/s for aluminum 
projectiles impacting aluminum dual-sheet targets2-7. This early work gave rise to initial “sizing equations” for rear 
wall thickness to prevent perforation of a given multi-wall system8. 
At the onset of the Apollo Project in 1964, one of the many engineering tasks undertaken by then North 
American Rockwell (NAR) was the calculation of the meteoroid hazard to the Command Service Module (CSM) 
Vehicle. In the 1964 to 1969 time period the Discrete Particle Analysis (DPA) method was developed for NASA by 
a NAR team9.  
The early 1970s saw some phenomenological studies sponsored by the United States Air Force that continued to 
examine the effects of material composition on multi-wall system response in terms of material phase changes10,11. 
The late 1970s and early 1980s saw an increase in the interest in the response of multi-wall targets to hypervelocity 
impacts and the development of ballistic limit wall thickness equations for such systems because of several then 
upcoming Comet Halley probe missions12,13. Building on the initial work on sizing equations in the 1960s and the 
work for the Apollo Project by Richardson, et al, in the late 1960s, efforts at NASA/JSC in the 1970s and early 
1980s focused also on developing sizing equations for upcoming missions and spacecraft, including the Space 
Shuttle and what was to eventually become the International Space Station. 
III. The 1980s and 1990s 
In the late 1970s and during the 1980s, Rockwell engineers completed several Space Shuttle studies to determine 
the hazard posed by impact of hypervelocity particles, including both meteoroids and space debris. The DPA 
program was applied again to determine the failure particle mass for numerous Space Shuttle components14.  
At around the same time, in the mid-1980s, Boeing (and Martin Marietta), under contract to the NASA/Marshall 
Space Flight Center, participated in the Space Station Freedom Phase B micrometeoroid and orbital debris testing 
and analysis program. Boeing was ultimately selected as the prime contractor for the Space Station following this 
effort, and published a multi-volume report documenting its Phase B activities15,16. This report presents the first 
three-part Whipple Shield BLE with a bucket at V=3 km/s (actually, it presents three different versions of the three-
part Whipple Shield BLE). 
The rationale for the various forms of each of the three parts in each BLE is also presented and discussed in the 
Phase B final report. In the beginning of the effort, Boeing used a version of the THOR 4717 equations for the low 
speed part of the curve. The intermediate speed equations came from their work in the mid-1960s, while the high 
speed was based on Wilkinson's penetration equation18. This set of equations was called “the original equation.” At 
the end of the effort, Boeing replaced the original equation with a set of equations called “the regression fit.” In this 
new set, the low speed portion used an updated version of the PEN4 equation14, the intermediate speeds used a 
regression fit to the Phase B impact test data, and the high speed part remained Wilkinson's equation19. This Boeing 
effort formed the foundation of BUMPER I, a risk assessment tool developed by Boeing for the Space Station 
Freedom project. 
The late 1980s saw additional work at the NASA/Johnson Space Center in the area of bumper and rear wall 
sizing equation development as new materials and new configurations were being considered for the Space Station 
Freedom wall configurations20-22. NASA/MSFC also began to study the effects of debris particle shape on the three 
part ballistic limit equation using hydrocodes23. 
In the early 1990s, BUMPER I came under configuration control at the NASA/JSC and became known as 
BUMPER II. Whipple Shield modification testing continued at NASA/JSC, Boeing, and NASA/MSFC to improve 
the damage resistance of the original Whipple Shield configuration24-27. The initial emphasis continued to be on 
sizing equations for both bumper thickness and pressure wall thickness. The three-part ballistic limit equations 
became the coin of the realm at NASA in the mid-1990s as work on sizing equations appeared to be phased out28-31. 
Also in the mid-1990s, Housen and Schmidt32 proved that the three-part projectile diameter vs. impact velocity 
(i.e. dp vs. V) Whipple Shield BLE developed by Boeing in the mid-1980s and the wall thickness required to stop 
penetration vs. impact velocity (tw vs. V) curves drawn in the mid-1960s are inverses of each other. That is, a plot of 
tw vs. V at fixed dp is approximately 1/dp vs. V at fixed tw. Figure 2 below shows a generic sizing plot from 19675. 
Superposed on it, as a dashed line, is its inverse. The shape of this dashed line is highly reminiscent of the three-part 




















Figure 1. Generic Thickness Sizing Equation5 and its Inverse 
 
Work on refining the three-part Whipple Shield BLE has continued. Recent improvements include, for example, 
a term that incorporates the effects of optional multi-layer insulation placed between the bumper and the pressure 
wall. In the most current version33,34, its high velocity region for normal impacts begins at 7 km/s, and can be 
verified by light gas gun data up to approximately 8 km/s. Its transitional velocity region (3 to 7 km/s for normal 
impacts) takes the form of a linear interpolation between the low and high velocity regions. As such, the accuracy of 
predictions in this hypervelocity region depends to a degree on the “anchor point” predictions from the low velocity 
regime (up to the 3 km/s). 
 




IV. Bumper II Limitations And Uncertainty Considerations 
NASA uses the BUMPER II computer program to provide point estimate predictions of MMOD risk for the 
Space Shuttle and the ISS. While BUMPER II is a powerful tool, it does have limitations.  BUMPER II results 
provide a point estimate of MMOD risk with no assessment of its associated uncertainty.  Reporting risk predictions 
with uncertainty bounds enables those performing the program’s probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) to fold the 
results into those assessments and put them in perspective with the other risk contributors.  Risk predictions can also 
be used to help prioritize research programs to reduce the highest contributors to risk and uncertainty first.  
However, the uncertainties associated with underlying BUMPER II input models are still largely unknown. 
BUMPER II uses a variety of equations to predict damage to shuttle or ISS components in terms of an impacting 
particle’s density, velocity, and angle of impact. Some equations are developed by simply drawing a curve through 
fail/no-fail test data (the BLEs), while others are developed by performing statistical curve-fits to empirical data (the 
damage predictor, or DP, equations).  Considering the different approaches used to derive them, the DP equations 
and BLEs in BUMPER II belong to two different classes of empirical equations.  
The DP equations are simply, curve-fits to empirical data, that is, they are the results of statistical regression 
analyses of available test data.  As such, uncertainty bounds and/or confidence intervals can be obtained at the time 
that the regression analyses are being performed to form the DP equations. However, unlike the DP equations, the 
BLEs are not statistically based. They are not curve-fits, but are rather simply lines of demarcation between regions 
of penetration and non-penetration. As a result, and also unlike the DP equations, it is simply not possible to obtain 
uncertainty bounds and/or confidence intervals as part of the current procedure that is used to derive the BLEs. 
Alternative, innovative approaches must be developed to derive the BLEs using a statistics-based approach so that 
uncertainty information is forthcoming out of the analyses along with the equations themselves. 
V. A Statistics-Based Approach To BLE Uncertainty Modeling 
In order to allow one to make a statement that, for example, a given BLE is accurate to within +/-X% with a 
confidence of Y%, the BLEs must be derived using a consistent, statistics-based approach. Such an approach was 
proposed and used by Williamsen and Jolly35 to develop preliminary BLEs for the Space Station Freedom manned 
module multi-wall orbital debris shields. In Ref. 35, data were regressed to develop an empirical equation that 
defined a penetration parameter Pm in terms of impact parameters for a given set of target material properties and 
geometry, that is, 
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β γ δθ α θ= = ε+                         (1) 
 
In Eq. (1), α through ε are coefficients obtained through a standard nonlinear regression of Pm data. In its 
simplest form Pm may be visualized as a measure of the depth of penetration through an entire multi-wall shield 
system. It includes crater depth data prior to perforation of a critical target region as well as witness plate data after 
the perforation of a critical target region. 
In the context of a multi-wall shield, if the impact event results in a perforation of the bumper, but no penetration 
of the pressure wall, Pm=0. If the pressure wall is penetrated, then Pm = tw, the thickness of the pressure wall.  If the 
first witness plate is also perforated, then Pm= tw + twp1, where twp1 is the thickness of the first witness place; if the 
second is perforated, Pm= tw + twp1 + twp2; etc. If the pressure wall is cratered, but not perforated, then 0<Pm=dc<tw, 
where dc is the depth of the deepest pressure wall crater. Setting the penetration parameter equal to a predetermined 
value (i.e. tw) allowed Williamsen and Jolly to solve for critical diameter in terms of impact velocity that would 
result in just barely perforating the pressure wall. That is, using a statistics-based approach, the authors were able to 
arrive at BLEs for a variety of multi-wall systems. 
If this approach were to be adapted to rederive the BLEs currently within BUMPER II, two important results 
would follow. First, we would have statistics-based (and not simply hand-drawn) BLEs for a variety of shuttle 
components and ISS wall configurations. Second, we would be able to obtain, for each BLE so derived, the 
statistics-based uncertainty information that would allow us to make the statement that a given BLE is accurate to 
within +/-X% with a confidence of Y%. Since this is the type of information that is needed to develop overall 









 VI. Orbital Debris Shape And Orientation Considerations 
Until now, NASA’s orbital debris risk assessments for the Space Shuttle, International Space Station and other 
satellites have assumed that orbital debris particles are spherical in shape.  However, spheres are not expected to be a 
common shape for orbital debris; rather, orbital debris fragments might be better represented by other regular or 
irregular solids.  A major recommendation from a recent review by the NASA Engineering Safety Center37 called 
for NASA to establish shape and material parameters in future orbital debris environments, and to characterize the 
effect of these shapes on orbital debris damage predictions. Potential candidate orbital debris shapes considered by 
NASA’s Standard Breakup Model (SBM)38 include cubes (a common assumption used in many aircraft 
vulnerability models to simulate fragments), and flakes.  The SBM “flake” shape was derived from examining 
fragment shapes from ground-based hypervelocity impact tests against actual satellite structures, and is considered 
representative of actual orbital debris in the 1mm to 10mm size range.  Its aspect ratio changes as it increases in size 
(becoming more potato chip-shaped) in order to better reflect the actual aspect ratio of orbital debris as measured in 
terms of  radar cross section (RCS). 
The characteristic length is a measure of orbital debris size described in the SBM that is derived from the 
“average” value of three major dimensions of a given particle, and can be directly related to its average radar cross 
section (RCS). By deriving particle ballistic limits on the basis of their characteristic lengths, the risk of orbital 
debris penetration by different particle shapes can be directly derived using NASA’s orbital debris environment 
models. Williamsen, et al39 and Schonberg, et al40 used hydrocode assessments to derive ballistic limit curves for a 
variety of shapes and orientations.  Most recently, Williamsen, et al used the FATEPEN model and prior hydrocode 
data to extend this technique, examining the effects of shape and orientation considering the SBM “flake” shape on 
ballistic limit curves as well as on satellite penetration risk41.  Tables 1 and 2 summarize the predicted orbital debris 
penetration risk for simple cube shaped spacecraft when the BLEs derived by Williamsen, et al for “flake” and cube 
shapes are placed into BUMPER II, and compare them to predictions obtained a spherical-projectile-based BLE. It 
can be seen in these tables that SBM “flakes” produced only about half the penetration risk of a sphere of the same 
characteristic length for normal impact obliquity and for various impact orientations.  These results indicate the 
presence of a strong, inherent bias towards overdesign of orbital debris shields using current shielding design 
procedures because these procedures typically approximate the actual shape of orbital debris particles as 
merely spherical, and do not consider realistic impactor shapes in their assessments. 
 
 
Table 1. Results of Spacecraft Orbital Debris Risk Analyses for a Dual-Wall Shield Using Simplified Cube and 
Flake Ballistic Limit Curves, and Current Sphere Ballistic Limit Curves in BUMPER Code41 
 
Expected Orientation
Shape Case Penetrations Likelihood
Spheres All Obliquities 5.85E-05 100%
Normal Obliquity Only 8.29E-05 100%
Cube Face On 1.59E-05 23%
Edge On 3.89E-05 46%
Point On 5.90E-05 31%
SBM Flake Face On 2.32E-05 8%
Edge On 7.49E-05 15%
Point On 1.07E-04 15%
A-C Edge On 2.12E-05 31%
A-B-C Point On 2.23E-05 31%
Velocity




1 year duration (2007)
 
 




Table 2. Comparison of Spacecraft Risk Resulting from Assuming Cubes and Flakes Compared to Current 






Compared to Sphere 
(Normal Impact Case)
Sphere (All Obliquities) 5.85E-05 71%
Sphere (Normal Obliquity) 8.29E-05 100%
Cube (Normal Obliquity,      
All Orientations) 3.97E-05 48%
SBM Flake (Normal Obliquity, 
All Orientations) 4.32E-05 52%  
 
VII. Conclusions 
Meteoroid and orbital debris ballistic limit equations have historically consisted of formulas that include general 
features such as momentum or energy scaling and are supported by judiciously chosen impact tests. However, due to 
testing capability limitations and testing costs, only a limited number of impact tests have been conducted against 
materials that do not (and cannot) fully sample the relevant impact variables. Test facility limitations constrain the 
maximum particle velocity that can be achieved in the derivation of the damage prediction equations and do not 
represent the full spectrum of MMOD threat velocities. 
Many equations for a number of material and shield configurations have little data, and are derived from their 
assumed similarity to other empirically based damage equations. These characteristics result in different levels of 
confidence in the accuracy of the various equations used (depending on the relevance and extent of the data used in 
their derivation) and a concern regarding uncertainties in the accuracy of the equations as a whole. 
Statistical uncertainties for these damage prediction equations could be more rigorously derived from a closer 
examination of the original data or from additional test data (and possibly hydrocode analyses). Shields that are most 
likely to sustain critical MMOD failure should have higher expectations for statistical confidence in their underlying 
damage prediction equations, and their testing should be biased towards conditions that are as representative as 
possible of MMOD encounters (in impact velocity and obliquity). 
Many radar, in-situ, and ground-based studies have shown that orbital debris is not composed of spheres, but 
consists of fragments of varying sizes and shapes.  Until now, orbital debris risk assessments have concentrated on 
spheres, primarily due to limitations in computer and test resources.  Studies indicate that we may be over-predicting 
orbital debris risk by a factor of two for dual-wall shields by limiting our analyses to spheres instead of considering 
more representative debris shapes, such as cubes and flakes, along with a particle’s characteristic length.  
Considering these more representative debris shapes also carries with it the advantage of improving the quality and 
accuracy of our spacecraft risk analyses. 
There will always be a place for simple, initial risk analyses using ballistic limit equations that assume spherical 
orbital debris shapes.  However, the availability of improved, fast running PC-based computer models such as 
FATEPEN, and user-friendly, computationally efficient codes, such as AutoDyn (with its many modules, including 
SPH), renders the consideration of alternative debris shapes as a practical, cost-saving alternative to simply 
launching heavier-than-necessary shields. 
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